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FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT
CONSTITUTION:
A RESPONSE TO SIX VIEWS

FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION. By
James E. Fleming.1 New York: Oxford University Press.
2015. Pp. xv + 243. $75.00 (cloth).
James E. Fleming2
I.

INTRODUCTION

I am deeply grateful to Constitutional Commentary for
publishing this symposium on my recent book, Fidelity to Our
Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against
Originalisms. In the book, I put forward a sustained critique of
originalism—whether old or new, concrete or abstract, living or
dead. Instead, I defend what Ronald Dworkin called a “moral
reading” of the U.S. Constitution3 and what Sotirios A. Barber
and I have called a “philosophic approach” to constitutional
interpretation.4 By “moral reading” and “philosophic approach,”
I refer to conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract
moral and political principles—not codifying concrete historical
rules or practices—and of interpretation of those principles as
requiring normative judgments about how they are best
understood—not merely historical research to discover relatively
specific original meanings. Through examining the spectacular
1. Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in
Law, Boston University School of Law.
2. I wish to thank Imer Flores for organizing a conference on the penultimate draft
of my book at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) on February 1617, 2015. Most of the papers included in this symposium were originally prepared for that
conference.
3. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2-3 (1996).
4. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS xii, 155–70 (2007).
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concessions that originalists have made to their critics, I show the
extent to which even they acknowledge the need to make
normative judgments in constitutional interpretation. I argue that
fidelity in interpreting the Constitution as written requires a
moral reading or philosophic approach, not any version of
originalism or living constitutionalism. Fidelity commits us to
honoring our aspirational principles, not following the relatively
specific original meanings (or original expected applications) of
the founders. Originalists would enshrine an imperfect
Constitution that does not deserve our fidelity. Only a moral
reading or philosophic approach, which aspires to interpret our
imperfect Constitution so as to make it the best it can be, gives us
hope of interpreting it in a manner that may deserve our fidelity
(pp. xi, 3).
All but one of the essays included here were originally
drafted for a wonderful symposium Imer Flores organized on the
penultimate draft of the book at the National Autonomous
University of Mexico (UNAM). I benefitted greatly from the
commentaries there by Sotirios A. Barber, Imer Flores, Ken I.
Kersch, Linda C. McClain, and Larry Sager (all of which are
published here in revised form), as well as those by Richard Fallon
and Larry Solum. I revised the book significantly based on
criticisms Fallon and Solum made in draft papers and remarks at
the UNAM conference that are not published here. Fallon’s paper
made clear how important it was for me to stress that my
conception of fidelity in constitutional interpretation is not
theological or religious in the way that Jack Balkin’s conceptions
of constitutional faith, fidelity, and redemption seem to be.5 His
paper was so cogent that I completely accepted his criticisms and
accordingly revised the book throughout. Therefore, having
concluded that his essay had accomplished its constructive
purpose, he quite sensibly decided not to publish it. Solum’s
remarks prompted me to clarify that in my book I am addressing
his programmatic account of “the new originalism” as a family of
theories in his book, Constitutional Originalism. I am not
addressing his own theory of originalism, which he has been
developing in a number of works, published and unpublished,
over the years. I understand, from conversations with Solum, that
5. Richard Fallon, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Theology, draft prepared for the
conference on the penultimate draft of this book, held at the National Autonomous
University of Mexico.
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he plans to elaborate his own theory of originalism in three books
to be published over a number of years. I also thank Robert W.
Bennett for contributing a review to this symposium. I shall take
up the essays in alphabetical order.
II. BARBER: RESPONDING TO THE “PERSISTENT
RESURGENCE OF ORIGINALISM”
In 2007, Barber and I published a book, Constitutional
Interpretation: The Basic Questions, in which we took up
Dworkin’s famous call for a “fusion of constitutional law and
moral theory,” arguing for a philosophic approach to
constitutional interpretation.6 In doing so, we systematically
analyzed competing approaches—textualism, consensualism,
originalism, structuralism, doctrinalism, minimalism, and
pragmatism—that aim and claim to avoid making moral and
philosophic judgments about the best understanding of the
Constitution. We argued for a “fusion of approaches”: “Within
such a fusion, we . . . understand text, consensus, intentions,
structures, and doctrines not as alternatives to but as sites of
philosophic reflection and choice about the best interpretation
and construction of our constitutional commitments.”7
This book is a sequel or companion to Barber’s and my prior
book. In this book, I criticize particular originalisms in a more
thoroughgoing way and demonstrate the concessions many
originalists have made to the moral reading or philosophic
approach. Furthermore, I elaborate the place and constructive
uses of original meaning, precedent, and tradition in a philosophic
approach. I also recast leading conceptions of living
constitutionalism as moral readings that strive to be faithful to the
best understanding of the Constitution. I engage especially with
new varieties of originalism and living constitutionalism that have
emerged more fully since that prior book was completed (pp. xixii).
Barber says that, since 2007, he has excused himself from the
debate with “the so-called new originalisms” until now “because
[he] thought that there was little to be said about constitutional
interpretation that hasn’t been said” and because he thought “one
and only one approach” to constitutional interpretation “makes
6.
7.

BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 4, at xiii.
Id. at 190.
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sense,” namely, the approach Dworkin, Barber, and I have
defended.8 Even if Barber is right that there was “little to be said
. . . that hasn’t been said,” I think it may be worthwhile to repeat
(and, where necessary, reformulate) what we said before in order
to rebut the new originalisms that have sprung from the hydra
head of originalism. Indeed, since 2007, many people have
claimed to be saying something new in defense of new
originalisms. I have been invited to a number of conferences
assessing these new originalisms. Instead of sitting on the sidelines
and simply saying, “read Barber’s and my 2007 book,
Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions,” I have
thought it important to participate in these debates with the new
originalists, reformulating our arguments in defense of a
philosophic approach and criticizing their new formulations.
Barber acknowledges that “there are questions to ask about
the persistent recurrence of originalism.”9 He also observes that I
“revisit[] the interpretative debate to save new originalists from
themselves.”10 Indeed I do. I believe there is value in showing the
extent to which many of the new originalists acknowledge the
need to make moral judgments in constitutional interpretation,
even as they claim to be rejecting moral readings.
Barber further states: “What I fail to understand is Jim’s
optimism about the future of constitutional theory in the face of
the cultural and intellectual barriers to the one mode of
interpretation that makes sense.”11 He also has reservations about
my optimism in the face of political dysfunction and looming
constitutional failure.12 Admittedly, my disposition may seem
more optimistic than Barber’s, but my views on failure and fidelity
may not be as far from his analysis as he suggests. As Barber
notes, I acknowledge that “a clear form of failure would be a
people’s loss of the capacity to change or reform a constitution.”13
And I recognize that the Constitution may have contributed to
our present dysfunction through its failure adequately to sponsor
a formative project of cultivating the civic virtues and the
capacities needed to maintain constitutional self-government.
8. Sotirios A. Barber, On Jim Fleming’s Anti-Originalism, 31 CONST. COMMENT.
389, 389 (2016).
9. Id. at 391.
10. Id. at 389.
11. Id. at 394.
12. Id. at 395–96.
13. Id. at 395.
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Indeed, I suggest that our best hope for averting constitutional
failure may be, not to rewrite the Constitution, but to rewrite the
constitutional culture through reinvigorating such a formative
project (pp. 170, 184, 187). And so, I agree with Barber that
“constitutional fidelity rests on hopes for cultural change.”14 The
only place where I disagree with him is that he believes this
“would fall short of a real argument for constitutional fidelity,”15
whereas I think it stems from an argument for constitutional
fidelity—if we understand fidelity as honoring our aspirational
principles, not merely following our historical practices (pp. 20,
105-06, 173-38, 189, 191). I start from where we are: as citizens
working within our constitutional practice, adopting an attitude of
fidelity toward the Constitution despite its imperfections, trying
to interpret it so as to honor its commitments and make it the best
it can be.
III. BENNETT: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, NOT
THEORY OF THE FUNCTION OF COURTS
If Barber views my book from the perspective of a long-time
co-author who is close to the project, Bennett views it from a
standpoint completely outside the project.16 I wrote a book
engaging in debates between originalisms and moral readings,
including some versions of living constitutionalism. In 2011,
Bennett co-authored a book with Solum, participating in a
parallel
debate
between
originalisms
and
living
17
constitutionalisms. As such, I would have expected Bennett to
assess my criticisms of originalisms. I also would have expected
him to assess my account of moral readings and my recasting of
certain versions of living constitutionalism as moral readings. He
does neither.
Instead, he takes me to task for having written a work in
constitutional theory that ignores a traditional conception of the
function of courts as being to resolve disputes. To be sure, there
are longstanding and important debates between two competing
conceptions of the function of courts: to resolve disputes or to
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Robert William Bennett, The Document and the Drama, 31 CONST. COMMENT.
397 (2016).
17. ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE (2011).
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express values.18 But I did not enter into those debates.
Furthermore, I do not think that those debates map onto the
debates I did take up, between originalisms and moral readings.
Perhaps Bennett is assuming that a moral reading necessarily falls
on the expressing values side of those debates, and necessarily
rejects the resolving disputes conception. That is not necessarily
the case. In my book, I am writing theory of the Constitution—
what the Constitution is, how to interpret it, whether there is a
difference between interpretation and construction, what might
constitute constitutional failure, whether we should amend the
Constitution or indeed adopt a new one—not offering a view of
judicial power or the function of courts.
Moreover, my account of a moral reading is not courtcentered. It recognizes that constitutional interpretation occurs
both inside and outside the courts—not only by legislatures and
executives but also by social movements and citizens generally.
Constitutional interpretation in this “protestant” sense (pp. 89,
131-132) is not limited to a dispute resolution model. Our practice
of constitutional interpretation is broader than courts resolving
disputes. In terms of Bennett’s formulation, it is a much larger
“drama” than that of courts narrowly deciding the cases before
them.19 And so, our constitutional theories—whether originalist,
living constitutionalist, moral reading, or eclectic—are also
broader than that.
IV. FLORES: THE BEST UNDERSTANDING OF
FIDELITY
Imer Flores’s thoughtful essay—through addressing the basic
question I raised, Who is to interpret the Constitution?—
recognizes the breadth of a moral reading of the Constitution as
contrasted with a dispute resolution model of courts narrowly
deciding the cases before them.20 Every author must hope for
readers as careful and sympathetic as Flores. His interpretive
charity and generosity of spirit in engaging with my book recall
18. Some of the classic works in this debate included: Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978); Abram Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Owen Fiss, Foreword: The
Forms of Justice 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
19. Bennett, supra note 16, at 390, 403.
20. Imer B. Flores, Intelligent or Unintelligent Fidelity?, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 407
(2016).
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for me the warm hospitality with which he hosted the symposium
on the penultimate draft of it at UNAM. His essay prompts me to
acknowledge two significant points.
First, Flores’s observations in his opening comments at the
UNAM symposium led me to make subtle and nuanced revisions
throughout the book, especially with respect to my rhetorical
strategies of pitting moral readings against originalisms. Flipping
the originalists’ rhetorical strategy of asking, “Are we all
originalists now?,” I had examined the spectacular concessions
that originalists have made to their critics and asked, “Are we all
moral readers now?” Flores’s remarks prompted me to recast my
argument to say—whether or not we are all moral readers now,
which might mistakenly imply that we all have systematic,
coherent moral readings—we all (including originalists) now
acknowledge the need to make normative judgments in
constitutional interpretation (pp. 3, 126).
Second, reading Flores’s sympathetic explication of
Dworkin’s moral reading as well as my own recalls for me the
excitement I experienced when I originally read Dworkin’s
Taking Rights Seriously upon its publication in 1977. Although
other readers may have been most moved by the passages about
“taking rights seriously,” I was captivated by the power of
Dworkin’s rhetorical strategy of seeking to reclaim the virtue of
fidelity in constitutional interpretation from “the jurisprudence of
Richard Nixon,” a form of proto-originalism manifested in the
constitutional views of Nixon’s first nominee to the Supreme
Court, Justice William Rehnquist.21 The passages Imer quotes
from Taking Rights Seriously concerning fidelity were the
inspiration for my co-organizing a major symposium on “fidelity
in constitutional interpretation” for Fordham Law Review
featuring Dworkin as the keynote speaker.22 Those passages and
the conference itself in turn were the inspiration for my writing
the book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution. Flores shows
more fully than I did in my book that the aspiration to fidelity was
there from the beginning in Dworkin’s work. Flores also
instructively invokes the work of Lon Fuller distinguishing

21. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131–49 (1977).
22. See Symposium on Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249
(1997), in particular, Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia,
Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249 (1997).
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between “intelligent” and “unintelligent” fidelity.23 Whether or
not Fuller’s ideas on “positivism and fidelity to law” and “the
morality of law”24 influenced Dworkin’s initial formulations, they
certainly were an important antecedent for them. Flores is right
to bring Fuller’s ideas to bear on the arguments for moral readings
and against originalisms.
V. KERSCH: “CALL[ING] THE FIGHT” FOR MORAL
READINGS OVER ORIGINALISMS
Ken Kersch is an astute intellectual historian of American
political and constitutional development. Accordingly, I am
gratified that he concludes that “Fleming’s important new book
breaks new ground in its prominent attempt at synthesis” between
the “aspirationalism” of moral readings and the “historicism” of
originalisms, and that it is a “thoughtful, timely, and engaging
contribution to understanding the way we live now in the United
States, and in U.S. constitutional theory.”25 Relatedly, since many
critics seem to assume that moral readings are inherently utopian
and not adequately grounded in our constitutional practice, I am
delighted that he views my book as an advance that, through
reckoning more fully with “fit” with historical materials, has made
a moral reading more cogent—that I have made a “laudable
attempt to walk [my]self back” from liberal constitutional theory
that has been “very far out on that plank.”26
Kersch criticizes me, though, for striving to “call the fight”27
for aspirationalism over historicism. I need to draw a distinction
here. I did not mean to “call the fight” for aspirationalism over
historicism, but I confess that I did indeed mean to argue for the
superiority of moral readings over originalisms. To explain the
distinction: I argued that in our constitutional culture, the use of
history—what Kersch calls “historicism”—is not originalist (pp.
136-140). Here I took a page out of Jack Balkin’s extraordinarily
rich analysis of the uses of history in our constitutional practice:
23. Flores, supra note 20, at 421–22 (quoting and discussing Lon L. Fuller, The Case
of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 625–26 (1949)).
24. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969); Lon L. Fuller,
Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
25. Ken I. Kersch, Originalism’s Curiously Triumphant Death: The Interpenetration
of Aspirationalism and Historicism in U.S. Constitutional Development, 31 CONST.
COMMENT. 423, 434 (2016).
26. Id. at 432.
27. Id. at 425, 439.
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that it does not function as originalists, old and new, assume or
claim it does. To the contrary, he offered a typology of eleven
“styles of justification,” many of which use history in weaving
aspirationalism together with historicism.28 I also contended that
a moral reading could and should incorporate such uses of
history—in fitting and justifying our constitutional practice. This
is the concern for “fit” or “historicism” in my moral reading or
“aspirationalism” that Kersch applauds.
Again, I acknowledge that I did try to “call the fight” for
moral readings over originalisms. I argue that moral readings are
more faithful to our Constitution and our constitutional practice
than originalisms. Moreover, I contend that many “new
originalisms” are best understood as moral readings. But I was not
thereby trying to “call the fight” for aspirationalism over
historicism.29 Instead, I was presenting a philosophic approach as
a “fusion of approaches” that incorporates its “historicism” into
its “aspirationalism” by reckoning seriously with “fit” with
historical materials in a moral reading (pp. 33, 106-108, 136-140).
And I was arguing in favor of moral readings’ conception of
fidelity as honoring our aspirational principles, over and against
originalist conceptions of it as following our historical practices
(pp. 20, 105-106, 137-138, 189, 191). Perhaps my way of framing
the debates and my arguments was more polemical than
necessary, as in the subtitle of my book, “for moral readings and
against originalisms” (p. iii).
Finally, Kersch relates my book to the Rawlsian and
Dworkinian projects in constitutional theory to which I have
contributed in previous books.30 He characterizes my project as
“mopping up” and trying to show that my concern for fidelity, fit,
and justification was there in Rawls and Dworkin “all along.”31
Although, as just noted, Flores’s essay explicates some of the
antecedents in Dworkin’s work for the moral reading I develop in
my book, my project is not to “mop up” or to attribute my concern
for fidelity to Rawls and Dworkin. My work is, indeed, broadly
speaking, Rawlsian and Dworkinian. But my aim is not to put
28. Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 641, 659–60 (2013).
29. Kersch, supra note 25, at 424.
30. See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE
CASE OF AUTONOMY (2006); JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED
LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013).
31. Kersch, supra note 25, at 425.
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forward an exegesis of Rawls’s or Dworkin’s work. Instead, I have
developed a philosophic approach inspired by, and in the spirit of,
the general frameworks of Rawls and Dworkin. I ask the reader
to assess my arguments on their own terms—and in terms of
whether I offer a recognizable and attractive account of our
constitutional practice—not in terms of whether I have been true
to Rawls or Dworkin’s work or whether I have tidily “mopped
up” after them.
VI. MCCLAIN: MORAL READINGS VERSUS
ORIGINALISMS IN OBERGEFELL: THE “EMPTY
CUPBOARD” OF CONVENTIONAL ORIGINALISMS
I appreciate Linda McClain’s careful analysis of originalisms
versus moral readings in Obergefell v. Hodges (along with the
decision it overruled, DeBoer v. Snyder), the recent Supreme
Court decision recognizing that the fundamental right to marry
extends to gays and lesbians.32 Her paper richly substantiates two
claims I made in my book. First, that the new originalists who
argue that cases like Obergefell are not “anti-originalist” but
indeed are compatible with originalism—the “inclusive
originalists”—are engaging in moral readings and are trying to rid
their originalisms of the baggage of Justice Antonin Scalia’s and
Judge Robert Bork’s exclusive originalisms. Second, that the
exclusive originalists are not going to be persuaded by these new
“inclusive originalist” arguments (pp. 16-19).
Three things that come out in McClain’s analysis are telling.
First, when some new, inclusive originalist scholars filed an
amicus brief in Obergefell making “abstract originalist”
arguments for extending the fundamental right to marry to gays
and lesbians, other (more conventional) exclusive originalist
scholars filed an amicus brief counter-arguing that this abstract
originalism is more in line with Dworkin’s anti-originalist moral
reading than with a true originalism.33 Second, neither of the
originalist judges on the Supreme Court—Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas—was moved one inch by these inclusive
originalist arguments, nor were Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
32. Linda C. McClain, Reading DeBoer and Obergefell through the “Moral Readings
versus Originalisms” Debate: From Constitutional “Empty Cupboards” to Evolving
Understanding, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 441 (2016) (analyzing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015), and DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014)).
33. McClain, supra note 32, at 460–66.
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Alito.34 Third, the majority opinion, by Justice Kennedy, was not
moved in the slightest by these arguments and was not at all
originalist in any conventional sense. Instead, his opinion
exemplifies a moral reading.35 To be sure, history matters in
Kennedy’s opinion. But the history that matters is history as
evolving contemporary consensus moving away from the history
that the originalists say is relevant, that of the relatively specific
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. That is,
the history that matters is that of evolving contemporary
consensus working toward better understandings of our
constitutional commitments—not history of the founding as an
authoritative source that decides our questions for us (or that we
must follow).36
McClain’s analysis makes all of these points as plain as day.
Originalism in any conventional sense remains, as Justice
Ginsburg put it, “an empty cupboard”37 as far as sex equality and
equality for gays and lesbians are concerned. The most jawdropping statement I have ever read in constitutional theory is
William Baude’s “inclusive originalist” suggestion to the contrary
that “Obergefell seemed to pick the originalist route.”38 This
confirms my analysis in the book that his inclusive originalism
includes practically everything that a moral reader would be likely
to argue for in our constitutional culture (pp. 1, 15-19).
VII. SAGER: “FIDELITY TO THE BEST VERSION OF
OURSELVES”
I am delighted that Sager’s essay is “in the nature of a
concurring opinion.”39 For I view Sager, along with Barber, as the
leading proponents of a moral reading, philosophic approach, or
justice-seeking account working in constitutional theory today. In
my development of the moral reading, I simply adopted Sager’s
highly instructive account of the thinness or moral shortfall of
constitutional law as compared with our thicker conceptions of
constitutional justice and of justice generally. I also developed a
34. Id. at 464–64.
35. Id. at 466–67.
36. Id. at 466–73.
37. Id. at 446 (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth
and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 161, 164).
38. William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2382 (2015).
39. Lawrence Sager, Fidelity to the Best Version of Ourselves, 31 CONST. COMMENT.
479 (2016).
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form of what he has called a “justice-seeking” constitutional
theory: in which courts, legislatures, executives, social
movements, and citizens generally are partners in building out our
constitutional practice to honor the best understanding of our
constitutional commitments (pp. 89-90).
Sager’s opening formulation about the relationship between
the text of the Constitution and our constitutional practice is
exactly right: “[T]he text is in service of our practice; our practice
is not in service of the text . . . at least not until we arrive at the
conclusion that our practice is best served by an understanding
that connects us to the text in this dominating way.”40 That is a
characteristically incisive formulation that hones in on what is
wrong with many varieties of originalism: they fail to understand
the purpose of our constitutional practice. Sager seems to be
worried that I may not give sufficient weight to precedent in our
constitutional practice.41 I was walking a tightrope between
viewing precedent as an obligation (responding to Abner
Greene’s criticism) and viewing it as a factor or resource to be
taken into account in constructing the best interpretation of our
constitutional commitments (incorporating Balkin’s account) (pp.
102-105). I may have slipped on that tightrope and he may be right
that a moral reading should give precedent more weight than my
account did.
But Sager and I may not be as far apart as it might look. After
all, I did contend, in the spirit of Sager, that proponents of
common-law constitutional interpretation typically give greater
weight to precedent than originalists do (pp. 103-104). And I did
present my moral reading as a form of such common-law
constitutional interpretation (pp. 108-115). I suppose two things
may account for the rhetorical distance between Sager and me
with respect to precedent. One, perhaps my intense engagement
with originalists—and argument that moral readers are more
faithful to the text than are originalists—led me to emphasize text
more than he does. Two, although I fully recognize and insist that
we build out our constitutional practice over time, making
judgments expressed through precedents, I was not putting
forward a theory of precedent as such and therefore I did not
advance the usual justifications for following precedent (including
40.
41.

Id. at 479.
Id. at 487.
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those typically associated with common-law constitutional
interpretation). That may make it sound like I am giving less
weight to precedent than do some proponents of common-law
constitutional interpretation. Yet I view precedent as an
instantiation or approximation of the best understanding of our
justice-seeking Constitution (pp. 102-105). With that observation,
I hope to narrow the gap between Sager’s and my accounts.
Sager also expresses reservations with respect to my
aspiration to fidelity to our imperfect Constitution. As he sees it,
there is a “misalign[ment]” between my aspirationalism and my
commitment to fidelity.42 Perhaps there are affinities between
Sager’s and Barber’s skepticisms about my aspiration to fidelity
as compared with aspirations to seek justice. But my aim was to
reclaim the aspiration to fidelity from the originalists,
reconceiving it as honoring our aspirational principles, not simply
following our historical practices. I believe that there should be
enough justice-seeking contained in that conception of fidelity to
satisfy Sager. He encapsulates this conception well when he
suggests that mine is an aspiration to “fidelity to the best version
of ourselves.”43 To my mind, that seems to be a justice-seeking
account of our constitutional practice.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the title of his essay, Kersch cleverly speaks of
originalism’s “curiously triumphant death.”44 I chuckled when I
read that phrase. In this vein, I open my book by contending that
originalists make spectacular concessions to their critics and then
declare victory over them (p. 1). As originalist Keith Whittington
has acknowledged, originalism is like a character in a Night of the
Living Dead movie. Just when you think it is dead, it proves to be
alive.45 I have no illusions that I have vanquished the hydra head
of originalism, but I hope to have brought out some of the ways in
which many originalists now acknowledge the need to make
normative judgments in constitutional interpretation. And I hope
to have made some progress in recasting and reclaiming the
aspiration to fidelity to our imperfect Constitution.
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